Аннотация: The Northern Fleet, A New Military-Administrative Division and The Arctic Policy. The sketch.
The Northern Fleet, A New Military-Administrative Division and The Arctic Policy. The sketch.
1. A spring of events.
According to the new military-administrative division, the Northern Fleet is listed among the military districts.
If the Northern Fleet is considered the new military district (in the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 05.06.2020 No. 374 "On the military-administrative division of the Russian Federation" the Northern Fleet is not directly called the military district), then what is the main motive for the new "military-administrative division"? (We will not forget about the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet" [Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command] - nothing is said about this Command in Decree dated 05.06.2020 No. 374, but the Command apparently exist?)
If the Command exists, then which entity is referred to in Decree N 374? The Northern Fleet? Or the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command? Or are these synonyms?
It is not so easy to understand these terms ... Maybe there is a need for interpretation? ...
Roughly, in our opinion, the motivation is as follows.
There is the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic resources. A problem arises of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the Northern Sea Route and over the Arctic resources.
Strengthening various military structures seems to be a way to ensure such sovereignty. (We note, at the same time, that this whole situation in the Arctic is developing under conditions of depopulation of the Far East and 'development of cooperation' with China).
The strengthening and development of military structures in the Arctic, in our opinion, is a dead end strategy, which is leading the Russian Federation into a foreign policy dead end. (Venezuela, Syria ...).
It is necessary to move forward not by building up armed structures, but by developing cooperation, by means of diplomatic (multilateral) actions, by creating the most favorable international legal regime for Russia. Only the non-military way of asserting the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the Arctic is efficient, economical and long-term, meeting the interests of the modern Russian population.
All performances such as lowering some symbols to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean have the same useful efficiency as the well-known 180-degree turn of the plane over the Atlantic Ocean. Such performances (shows), in our opinion, cause irritation and deep distrust of Russia on the part of the Arctic and sub-Arctic powers, the entire international community.
2. Possible additional motives for new decisions on issues of military-administrative division (Arctic topic).
It can be assumed that with the implementation of new measures, secrecy, restrictions on access to information, and restrictions on the physical access of citizens of the Russian Federation to the corresponding Arctic territories will be strengthened.
All kinds of affiliated companies will have the opportunity to carry out profitable projects: (1) at the expense of the state budget, to exploit natural resources, apparently, in a predatory manner, (2) directing the money received in one direction, and leave the environmental problems to the state for solving them for years, decades, centuries ...
3. Potential risks of new decisions on issues of military-administrative division (Arctic topic).
Gradually, the structure arises - a huge, largely self-sufficient and inaccessible for external management and control (which in charge of the Arctic territories) .
However, the depravity of a huge bureaucratic structure can consist not only in its autonomy from external influences.
Due to its size, such the structure may face the problem of internal control over its own units.
4. Generalization.
From the point of view of the strategic foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation, new decisions on issues of military-administrative division (in general, relatively low efficiency of diplomatic activity and relatively high activity in the military sphere in the Arctic region) are a dead end direction for the Arctic policy and does not correspond to the interests of the today population living in the territory RF.
Strengthening the regimes of secrecy and inaccessibility carries enormous environmental, economic and political risks.
From a purely military point of view, the effectiveness of new solutions is highly questionable.
The prospects for (newly) created structures (in the Arctic) are very vague. Due to the secrecy regime, any negative information about events in the respective territories will appear extremely rarely in the minimum amount and the most filtered form.
When society and the state will face a situation of aggravation of the foreign policy situation (due to the Arctic policy) and complex environmental problems (in the Arctic), then something will be difficult to fix (in some cases, it will be impossible).
One of the possible options is the creation of an Arctic flotilla that will ensure security on the Northern Sea Route (with parameters, which will not pose a threat to the Arctic and sub-Arctic countries).
It is necessary to move forward through international agreements, maximum information openness, minimum military presence in the Arctic, reasonable level of access to Arctic regions for all citizens of the Russian Federation, maximum expansion of public control (including international control) in relation of the Arctic territories.
Peaceful, non-militarized, generally accessible, open Arctic, the maximum preserved nature of the Arctic - such an Arctic corresponds to the interests of the modern population of the Russian Federation and the interests of the peoples of other Arctic and sub-Arctic countries.
Of course, the above considerations cannot cast a shadow on the glorious history of the Northern Fleet, known throughout the world.
(DXCIII. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears in the morning on February 14, 2019.
DC. The Story about Bulgakov and about polar bears.
DCIII. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears on February 17, 2019.
DCVIII. The Sketch about E2-E4 or Will come Abundance soon.
DCXVII. The Story of how Vanya Zhukov wanted to study the "Kerch" politics.
MCCСCLXXX. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears on February 26, 2019.
MCCСCLXXXI. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears on the afternoon of February 26, 2019.
MCCСCLXXXII. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears in the evening of February 26, 2019.
MCCСCLXXXIII. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears in the evening of February 26, 2019. Series 2.
DCLXXIII. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears on March 13, 2019.
DCLXXVII. The Story of how Vanya Zhukov mastered the Arctic diplomacy.
DCCXII. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears on March 25, 2019. Series 2.
DCCLV. The Story about interest in the Novaya Zemlya and to polar bears on April 8, 2019.
DCCLXI. The Monologue about the Arctic Forum.
DCCXCVIII. The Story how Vanya Zhukov applied international experience in "The Intercontinental project".
MCCXLI. Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Lavrov. An essay on the history of Russia 's foreign policy.
MCCLXXIX. Senya and an Arctic projects. The story.)
June 6, 2020 11:07
Translation from Russian into English: June 8, 2020 07:11.
Владимир Владимирович Залесский 'Северный флот, новое военно-административного деление и арктическая политика. Очерк'.